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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
INCOME TAX LITIGATION: THE
ARENA FOR MORALS?
W. Scoti Van Alsiyne, jr.*
Jerome R. Barton**
I. INTRODUCTION
"Moral turpitude is not the touchstone of taxability."u "The
mere fact that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an
illegal act ... [does not] ... make it nondeductible."12  The
Federal income tax laws are not intended ". . . to penalize illegal
business by taxing gross income instead of net income."3  Are
these remarks realities in life? After cursory examination of
the case law involving income taxes and the violation of other
laws, federal and state, it can be argued that moral turpitude and
concomitant penalties are indeed recognized by the courts in
dealing with income tax problems.
This article has two principal objectives. First, to analyze
the income tax treatment of illegal expenditures in general.
Second, to explore the argument that Congress may not con-
stitutionally deny the allowance of any expenditure which is a
part of cost of goods sold and represents, therefore, a return of
capital as opposed to income.
The decisions dealing with illegal expenditures illustrate the
fact such expenditures have caused a considerable amount of
confusion in Federal income tax law. One underlying cause of
the confusion has been said to be ". . . emotional antagonism to
* B.A. 1948, University of Buffalo; M.A. 1950, LL.B. 1953, S.J.D. 1954,
University of Wisconsin; lecturer, University of Wisconsin Law School;
practicing attorney, Madison, Wisconsin.
* B.S. 1956, LL.B. 1958, University of Nebraska: practicing attorney;
associate of Mason, Knudsen, Dickeson & Berkheimer, Lincoln, Ne-
braska.
1 Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
2 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943); Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Commissioner v.
Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
3 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943); United States v.
Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27
(1958).
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the illegal nature of the activities. . .. ,,4 Another underlying
cause may be traced to semantic difficulties which arise in ap-
plication of technical terms and concepts set forth in the Internal
Revenue Code. Tax language has its own special meanings which
may or may not agree with the meanings ascribed to the same
language by economists, businessmen, accountants, or even a
general practitioner of the law.
How does the term "illegality;' fit into the tax picture and
what effect does it have upon the technical terms and concepts
of Federal income tax law? A hypothetical situation should serve
as a vehicle to examine the ramifications of the term in the con-
text of Federal income taxes. Let us assume the existence of
a respectable printing company, Black & White Printers, Inc.
This company was faced with a shortage of its basic raw material
-paper-during the recent Korean conflict. The Defense Pro-
duction Act of 19505 placed a ceiling price on paper. In order
to continue in business, Black & White was confronted with two
alternatives: paying over-ceiling prices for the paper, or ob-
taining control of a paper manufacturer through purchase of
such a business. Each of these alternatives raises interesting tax
consequences but before exploring the possible consequences in
detail, note that this simple hypothetical situation with its two
alternatives can involve a number of technical tax terms such
as "income", "capital", "deduction", "cost of goods sold", "legality",
and "illegality". The precise meaning of these terms is somewhat
clouded within the tax law and certainly these terms have par-
ticular meanings to businessmen, accountants, economists, and
others. Such other groups may or may not define the terms
in a manner consistent with the tax law or with each other.
Further, and more important, such other groups may well use
their own definitions as a basis for economic decision and the
question is immediately raised as to whether the tax definitions
are realistic in terms of a market society.
Before pursuing the tax consequences of the two alternatives
posed above, it is helpful, as an introduction to those consequences,
to examine very briefly the taxation of illegal income. Although
Black & White is engaged in a legal business, if they were involved
in an illegal business, would their income be subject to Federal
income tax in the first place?
4 Keesling, "Illegal Transactions and The Income Tax," 5 U.C.L.A.
L.Rev. 26 (1958).
5 50 U.S.C.A. App. 308, 64 Stat. 798.
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II. TAXATION OF ILLEGAL INCOME
The 1913 Income Tax Act defined "gross income" as includ-
ing the gains, profits and income derived from transactions of
any "lawful" business.6 The word "lawful" was omitted from
the subsequent income tax legislation. Since that time, the
Treasury Department has not hesitated to tax all incomes of il-
legal businesses, transactions, and activities. The omission of the
word "lawful" in the subsequent Acts has been treated as an
indication of Congressional intent to tax all incomes regardless
of the legality or illegality of the business or activity from which
derived.7
In United States v. Sullivan,8 the taxpayer was convicted of
fraudulently failing to file an income tax return reporting in-
come from an illegal liquor business. In order to sustain the con-
viction, it was imperative to determine whether illegal income
was required by law to be reported. The court rejected the argu-
ment that illegal income was not taxable with this statement:
We see no reason to doubt the interpretation of the act or
any reason why the fact that a business is unlawful should
exempt it from paying the taxes that, if lawful, it would have
to pay.9
Consequently, it is well settled today that all income derived
from illegal or legal businesses, transactions or activities are sub-
ject to federal income taxes.'0 Gross income has been held to
include, among others, receipts from bootlegging operations and
other illegal liquor dealings," gambling,' 2 extortion,' 3 usury,
14
6 38 Stat. 167 (1913).
7 United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 479 (1922); Rutkin v. United
States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); See dissenting opinion of Justice Burton
in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 419 (1946).
8 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
9 Id. at p. 263.
i0 Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189; United States v. Sullivan, 274
U.S. 259; Vol. 1, Merten's, Law of Federal Income Taxation, s. 6A.13.
See cases cited, infra, notes 11-20. For collection of cases on illegal
income, See 43 ALR 799, 51 ALR 1026, 166 ALR 89.
1 United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477 (1922); United States v. Sullivan,
supra note 8; Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1926);
Carnahan v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1206 (1947); Green v. Commissioner,
11 BTA 185 (1928); Schultzer v. Commissioner, 18 BTA 444 (1929).
12 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Johnson v. United States,
318 U.S. 189; Cohen v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1156 (1947); Carnahan v.
Commissioner, 9 T.C. 1206 (1947); Mill v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 691
(1945); Silver v. Commissioner, 42 BTA 461 (1940); Huntington v.
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abortions, 15 bribery,16 kickbacks and commercial bribery,'7 ran-
som for kidnapping,' 8 sales in excess of ceiling prices, 19 and forms
of graft and swindling.20
It has been suggested that the government's recognition of
illegal operations for income tax purposes is the equivalent of
putting the government in partnership with the criminals; that
such recognition gives the activity a status of respectabiliy; but,
to adopt a policy of not taxing income from illegal operations
would place a premium on illegal enterprises.2 1 If such a policy
were adopted, it has been intimated that some states would pro-
hibit activities which are presently legal in order to accord their
participants preferential exemption. 22  There is no logical reason
to treat incomes differently based upon the legality or illegality
of its source.23
Commissioner, 35 BTA 835 (1937); Weiner v. Commissioner, 10 BTA
905 (1928).
13 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); United States v. J. J.
Moran, 236 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1956); Kahn v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d
247 (10th CA, 1954); Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 340 (7th
Cir. 1942).
'4 Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. 1938).
15 Karger v. Commissioner, 13 TCM 661 (1954); Dom v. Commissioner, 6
TCM 848 (1947).
16 Chadeck v. United States, 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1935); United States v.
Comerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1933).
17 Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1951); United States v. Bruswitz,
219 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1955); Sommers v. Commissioner, 14 TCM 793
(1955).
Is Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 340 (7th CA, 1942).
19 Kentucky Distributing Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 312 (1951); U. S.
Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 TCM 778 (1955); Leiser v. Commis-
sioner, 11 TCM 932 (1952); Petit v. Commissioner, 10 TC 1253 (1948).
20 Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949); Akers v. Scofield,
167 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1948); cert den 335 U.S. 823 (1949); Chadeck v.
United States, 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1935); United States v. Iozia, 104
F.Supp.846 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
21 Keelsing, "Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax", 5 U.C.L.A. L.Rev.
26, 29 (1958).
22 Id. at p. 31, see note 32.
23 "There is no illusion about the payment of a tax exaction. Each tax,
according to a legislative plan, raises funds to carry on government.
The purpose here is to tax earning and profits less expenses and
losses. If one or the other factor in any calculation is unreal, it dis-
torts the liability of the particular taxpayer to the detriment or ad-
vantage of the entire tax-paying group." Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S.
473, 476 (1940). Cf. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 537 (1938).
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It does not make any difference whether Black & White
Printers engage in a lawful or unlawful business. Their income
will be taxed either way under the income tax laws. To return,
however, to our principal problem, recall that Black & White
Printers still need to obtain a supply of paper in order to remain
in business. If they choose the alternative of paying blackmarket
prices, what Federal income tax consequences ensue? This de-
pends upon the manner in which they treat the over-ceiling ex-
penditure. First, they may consider handling such an outlay as
a "deduction" i.e. an ordinary and necessary expense of doing
business which is subtracted from gross income.
III. EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY ON DEDUCTIONS
Since illegal income of a taxpayer is included in his gross
income, it might seem to naturally follow that illegal expense
incurred in producing any income (legal or illegal) ought to be
allowed as a deduction. As a matter of fact, however, this is
not the law. Illegal expenditures have been consistently dis-
allowed as deductions.24  A few expenses which have been dis-
allowed, among others, are: fines and penalties;25 rent, salaries
and expenses of bookmaking enterprises; 26 bribery and protection
payments; 27 expenses of abortionists; 2s obsolesence of property
formerly legal which has been outlawed;29 salary payments in
24 For other materials, see Lurie, "Deductability of Illegal Expenses", 11
NYU Tax Institute, 1189 (1952); Stapleton, The Supreme Court Rede-
fines Public Policy, 30 Taxes 641 (1952); note, 54 Harv.L.Rev. 852
(1941) for analysis and collection of cases; annot. 175 ALR 370; 27
ALR 2d 498.
2G Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Standard Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1942).
26 Mesi v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 513 (1955); Silberman v. Commissioner,
44 BTA 600 (1941); Slavin v. Commissioner, 43 BTA 1100 (1941). Contra.
Commissiofter v. Sullivan, No. 119, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), held rent and
wages of bookmaker were allowable as ordinary and necessary ex-
penses. But see also Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir.
1956).
27 Burroughs Bldg. Materials Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 394 (10th Cir.
1949); Stralla v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 801 (1947); Caldwell v. Commis-
sioner, 47 BTA 168 (1942); Maddas v. Commissioner, 40 BTA 572 (1939),
aff'd 114 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1940).
28 Karger v. Commissioner, 13 TCM 661 (1954).
29 Clark v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930).
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excess of ceiling prices; 30 and political influence payments.3 1
What is the basis for disallowing illegal expenses as deduc-
tions? The Internal Revenue Code does not contain any provi-
sion, either expressly or impliedly, which prescribes that the
legality or illegality of an item is determinative of its deducti-
bility.32 The disallowance has been the product of the Treasury
Department and judicial decisions.
The Commissioner's usual argument is that "... deductions are
a matter of legislative grace and as such should be narrowly
construed."3 3  It is undisputed that Congress has the power to
allow or deny an expense as it chooses in determining "taxable
income" from gross income.3 4 But, as pointed out, Congress has
remained neutral in regard to the "legal vs. illegal" test for ex-
penditures. Notwithstanding this, the Treasury Department and
Courts have made this distinction between legal deductions and
illegal deductions.
Under the general rule that deductions are to be allowed
only if there is a specific statutory provision or authority there-
for,3 5 a successful attempt has been made to establish that there
is no authority for the deduction of illegal expenses. The reason-
ing applied is that only "ordinary and necessary" business ex-
penses are specifically authorized. An illegal expense is not one
which is "ordinary and necessary" to the operation of the tax-
30 Pedone v. United States, 151 F.Supp. 288 (Ct. Cl. 1957); N. A. Wood-
ward Co. v. Kavanaugh, 102 F.Supp. 9 (DC Mich. 1952), aff'd 202 F.2d
154; Weather-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1312 (1951).
31 Easton Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 35 BTA 189 (1936);
New Orleans Tractor Co. v. Commissioner, 35 BTA 218 (1936).
32 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); Lilly v. Commissioner,
343 U.S. 90 (1951); Ellery v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 407 (1944). But see,
Textiles Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
33 New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934); Commissioner v.
Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Beiling, "Practical Legal Aspects of Ac-
counting", 30 Taxes 1028 (1952), which suggest three exceptions of
which cost of goods sold is one. For an argument against this rule,
see, Griswold, "An Argument Against the Doctrine That Deductions
Should Be Narrowly Construed As a Matter of Legislative Grace".
56 Harv.L.Rev. 1142-47 (1943).
34 Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934), where
the court used the following language: "Unquestionably Congress has
power to condition, limit, or deny deductions from gross income in
order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax .... "
35 Vol. 4, Merten's, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 25 (1956).
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payer's business. 36  Therefore, it is not deductible. This reason-
ing ignores the fact that in an illegal business, it is quite "ordinary
and necessary" to incur fines, penalties and protection obliga-
tions. It is not disputed that such payments are not a normal
nor ordinary and necessary expense of a lawful business. But,
the test which is applied to deductions is not what would be
ordinary and necessary in a lawful business, but one which is
commonly incurred in the trade or community of the particular
taxpayer.37 A "necessary" expense need not be essential, but ap-
propriate and helpful to the taxpayer's business. 38 From the
point of view of a taxpayer engaged in an illegal business, is it
not ordinary for him to be fined and is it not helpful, if not es-
sential, to his business to make protection payments?
The argument which usually sustains the disallowance of
illegal expenses is that the allowance of a deduction for an illegal
expenditure would "frustrate public policy.13 9 The reason given
is that the allowance of such expense will, through the reduction
of tax liability, benefit and encourage participation in the illegal
activity, contrary to the law which prohibits such activity.40 The
Supreme Court affirmed the disallowance of an illegal expense:
... in order that the tax deduction consequences might
not frustrate sharply defined state policies proscribing particu-
lar types of conduct. 41
In order to make this test more certain, it was later further
limited to:
... sharply defined national or state policies proscribing
particular types of conduct, evidences by some governmental
declaration thereof.42
36 Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, No. 95, 356 U.S. 38 (1958);
Tank Truck Rentals Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 109, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
37 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); see Featherson, "Custom and
Usage as Elements in Determining Tax Liability", 12 N.Y.U. Tax Inst.
563 (1954).
38 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); supra, note 35.
39 Supra, notes 24-31.
40 In Tank Truck Rental, Inc. v. United States, 356 U.S. 30 (1958), the
Court said: "To allow the deduction sought here would but encourage
continued violations of state law by increasing the odds in favor of
non-compliance. This would only tend to destroy the effectiveness
of the state's maximum weight laws." Also stated: "Deductions of
fines and penalties uniformly have been held to frustrate state policy
... by reducing the 'sting' of the penalty."
41 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467 (1943); Lilly v. Commissioner,
343 U.S. 90 (1952).
42 Ibid. Also see Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. United States, 356 U.S. 30
(1958).
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But in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. United States, 43 the Su-
preme Court was reluctant to lay down an absolute standard or
test and added this reservation:
This is not to say that the rule as to frustration of sharply
defined national or state policies it to be viewed or applies
in any absolute sense. 44
In applying the frustrations of sharply defined national or
state public policy tests, the courts have drawn a distinction
between expenses which are illegal per se, the deduction of which
is disallowed, and the "legitimate" expenses of an illegitimate
business, the deduction of which is allowed.45 This distinction
turns upon the intricate refinements of the state or national law
as to inherent legality of illegality of the particular expense in-
volved. 46
Since the Black & White Printers is a legal business, but the
blackmarket payments are illegal by federal law, let us examine
the cases dealing with illegal expenses of legal business as a
deduction from gross income.
IV. ILLEGAL EXPENSES OF LEGAL BUSINESS
The most recent decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with
illegal expenses of legal business were handed down on March 17,
1958. In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,47 the tax-
payer, in the legitimate business of trucking, paid $41,060.84 in
fines for 718 wilful and 28 innocent violations of the state max-
imum weight laws during 1951. The Supreme Court, in denying
these fines as deductions, stated:
A finding of 'necessity' cannot be made, however, if allowance
of the deductions would frustrate sharply defined national or
state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced
by some governmental declaration thereof.48
43 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
44 Ibid. The Court gave the reason that: "The flexibility of such a
standard is necessary if we are to accommodate both the Congressional
intent to tax only net income and the presumption against Con-
gressional intent to encourage violation of declared public policy."
45 Tank Truck Rental, Inc. v. United States, op. cit. note 42; Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); Commissioner
v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394
(10th Cir. 1949); Comeaux v. Commissioner, 10 TC 201 (1948).
46 Cf. Meisi v. Commissioner, 25 TC 513 (1955).
47 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
48 Id. at p. 30. See also Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473
(1943).
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The reasoning of the Supreme Court was that:
... to allow the deduction sought here would but encourage
continued violations of state law by increasing the odds in favor
of noncompliance. This could only tend to destroy the effective-
ness of the State's maximum weight laws.4 9
The Court intimated that there was a distinction between
an act which is itself prohibited, and an act or expense of an
illegal business, when they said:
Certainly the frustration of state policy is most complete and
direct when the expenditure for which deduction is sought is
itself prohibited by statute... If the expenditure is not itself.
an illegal act, but rather the payment of a penalty imposed by
the State because of such act, as in the present case, the frustra-
tion attended upon deduction would be only slightly less remote,
and would clearly fall within the line of disallowance.50
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States,51 a companion
case of Tank Truck Rental, Inc., also involved the deductibility
of fines paid for maximum weight law violations. The Court
applied the "frustration of policy" rule in disallowing the deduc-
tion, but gave the following as an additional reason for its holding:
Wholly apart from possible frustration of state policy, it does
not appear that payment of the fines in question was 'necessary'
to the operation of petitioner's business. This, of course, prevents
any deduction.52
Note that the expenditures involved were the direct result of
an illegal act, but not themselves prohibited. Under the author-
ity of these two cases, it would appear the Black & White's pay-
ments in excess of ceiling prices would not be allowed as an
"ordinary and necessary" business expense.
In Weather-Seal Mfg. Co.,53 wage payments were made in
excess of ceiling prices. The taxpayer claimed them as part of
his cost of goods sold rather than as a deduction because they
were direct labor costs.5 4  The Tax Court held that the wages
constituted compensation for personal services and were there-
fore controlled by the "deduction" section of the Code and since
49 Id. at p. 35.
GO Ibid.
,1 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
52 Id. at p. 39. Court cited Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940) as this
authority.
53 16 T.C. 1312 (1951).
54 The cost of goods sold concept will be examined more fully, infra.
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such payments violated the ceiling price they should not be
allowed as a deduction. The basis for denying the deduction
was that the payment directly violated a sharply defined and
declared national policy. It will appear in subsequent discussion
that the Court was, by all definitions and tests, clearly right in
its analysis and position here.
The frustration of public policy rule applies not only to il-
legal expenditures, but to expenditures which are contrary to
general public policy. In Easton Tractor & Equipment Co. v.
Commissioner," commissions were paid to an agent for the sole
purpose of using his personal influence with the state govern-
ment to makes sales to the state's road department. The com-
pany deducted the commissions paid, but the Commissioner dis-
allowed them. The Board took the position that the contracts
between the company and the agent would be void and unen-
forceable in the courts as being against public policy. Conse-
quently, the commissions were disallowed as a deduction. The
Board said that:
... such commissions having been paid on an agreement void
and unenforceable because of its being in direct contravention of
positive law, did not constitute such an ordinary and necessary
expense as contemplated by the applicable statute .... 56
The Government's right to legislate free of lobbying influences
have been placed on the same plane. In Textile Mills Securities
Corp. v. Commissioner,57 the expenses of lobbying and propa-
ganda paid by an agent employed to secure legislation from Con-
gress authorizing the recovery of German properties seized dur-
ing the World War were claimed as deductions. The Supreme
Court, in affirming the Commissioner's denial of this item as a
deduction, was able to find in its own pronouncements condemn-
ing "insidious influences through legislative halls," sufficient ex-
pression of national policy to entitle the Treasury to rely thereon
in drawing a line between legitimate business expenses and those
arising from contracts to which the law gives no sanction because
they violate public policy. The Court stated:
... there is no reason, why, in absence of clear Congres-
sional action to the contrary, the rule-making authority cannot
employ the general policy in drawing a line between legitimate
business expense and those arising from that family of contracts
to which the law has given no sanction. The exclusion of the
55 35 B.T.A. 189 (1936).
56 Id. at p. 191.
57 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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latter from "ordinary and necessary" expenses certainly does no
violence to the statutory language. The general policy being clear
it is not for us to say that the line was too strictly drawn.58
Since the Black & White Printers, as a legal business, will
not be able to treat blackmarket payments as "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses, i.e. as a deduction from gross in-
come, would the tax consequences be any different if they were
engaged in an illegal business?
V. "LEGITIMATE" EXPENSES OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
BUSINESS
The concept of "legitimate expenses of an illegitimate busi-
ness" was first introduced in a case of an operator of a "horse-
room."5 9  Strangely, the taxpayer was allowed to deduct the
wages of his gambling table operators, but was disallowed his
protection expenses. The Court, itself, acknowledged that "the
distinction may at first seem nebulous." Nevertheless, the doc-
trine was introduced.
The Tax Court, in two other cases,60 again applied this doc-
trine. This time the distinction was drawn between legitimate
and illegitimate expenses as being those made in the actual pro-
duction of income and those made for the purpose of perpetrating
a violation of state law. They applied the frustration of public
policy test in denying the expenses which were deemed not
"legitimate". It is difficult to accept this distinction that ex-
penditures for the purpose of perpetrating a violation of state
law are different from those made in the operation of a business
which is prohibited by state law.
In this area, up to a certain point, the government is apply-
ing the income tax laws consistently. They are recognizing illegal
income and also recognizing some expenses in connection with
the production of the illegal income. The test which they are
using is that the expense must meet the ordinary and necessary
test of a lawful business, not what is ordinary and necessary in
an unlawful business.
The legitimate expense of an illegitimate business has been
approved and sustained by the Supreme Court. In Commissioner
58 Id. at p. 339.
59 G. A. Comeaux, 10 T.C. 201, aff'd Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d
394 (10th Cir. 1949).
60 See Stralla, 9 T.C. 801 (1947) and Kjar, CCH Memo Dec. 12, 114-E, P-H
Memo T.C. par. 41, 446 (1941).
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v. Sullivan,61 which involved the operation of illegal gambling
enterprises, the question presented to the Supreme Court was
whether the amounts paid to lease the premises and hire em-
ployees were deductible. The taxpayer received income from
bookmaking establishments in Chicago and under Illinois law,
both the business and the payments for rent and wages were
illegal. The Tax Court denied all the expenses, but the Supreme
Court allowed the rent and wage deductions. In so holding, the
Court said:
The policy that allows as a deduction the tax paid to con-
duct the business seems sufficiently hospitable to allow the normal
deductions of the rent and wages necessary to operate it. 6 2
One of the reasons given by the Court was that:
If we enforce as federal policy the rule espoused by the Com-
missioner in this case, we would come close to making this type of
business taxable on the basis of its gross receipts, while all other
businesses would be taxable on the basis of net income. If that
choice is to be made, Congress should do it.6 3
The standard employed by the Court to determine the "legit-
imate" expenses of an illegal business was that:
... amounts paid as wages to employees and to the landlord
as rent are 'ordinary and necessary expenses' in the accepted
meaning of the words. This is enough to permit the deduction,
unless it is clear that the allowance is a device to avoid the con-
sequences of violations of law, as in Hoover Motor Express Co.
v. United States .... 64
The Supreme Court ignored the fact that the wages and rent
payments were expressly prohibited and illegal under Illinois
law. Thus, this case supports the rule that if an expense item
is one generally thought of as being ordinary and necessary, the
legal or illegal nature of the business is immaterial. It definitely
affirms the doctrine of legitimate expenses of an illegitimate bus-
iness.
In the Lilly v. Commissioner case,"5 the issue related to the
deductibility of "kickback" payments made by an optician to
doctors for the referral of business. The kickbacks were allowed
61 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
62 Id. at p. 29.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 343 U.S. 90 (1951).
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as being ordinary and necessary expenses. The Court in so hold-
ing, stated:
The transactions from which they arose were of common or
frequent occurrence in the type of business involved. They re-
flected a nation-wide practice. Consequently, they were 'ordi-
nary' in the generally accepted meaning of the words ... The
payments were likewise 'necessary' in the generally accepted
meaning of that word. It was through the making of such pay-
ments that petitioners had been able to establish their business. 66
The Court expressly stated that they did not voice approval
of the business ethics or public policy involved, but since this
did not frustrate a public policy evidenced by some govern-
mental declaration, there was no authority to disallow the kick-
backs as a deduction.
In the course of their opinion,67 the Court quoted with ap-
proval from the Circuit Court decision in Heininger v. Commis-
sioner,68 as follows:
Without this expense, there would have been no business.
Without the business, there would have been no income. With-
out the income, there would have been no tax. To say that this
expense is not ordinary and necessary is to say that that which
gives life is not ordinary and necessary. 69
That statement would be applicable in almost all illegal ex-
pense situations to a limited degree. It is apparent that the courts
have drawn a distinction between expenses, which are themselves
prohibited by a declared national or state policy, and those which
are commonly accepted to be ordinary and necessary .expenses.
If the expense is the latter, the legal or illegal nature of the
business is immaterial in determining its deductibility.
As far as public policy is concerned, it is difficult to say that
an expense of a racketeer, gambler or bootlegger does not do
violence to the law which prohibits the business. Of course, one
may repair to Congress to remedy this situation.
By way of summary, therefore, it can be said that if Black
& White Printers were an illegal business, the question of the
deductibility of the blackmarket payments would depend upon
whether the courts considered such payments were made for
the purpose of perpetrating a violation of another law or whether
06 Id. at p. 93.
07 Id. at p. 94.
68 133 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1943).
0 Id. at page 570.
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they were ordinary and necessary expenses of a business which
is prohibited by law. Since the test of the latter appears to
be whether or not such expenses would be allowed a legal busi-
ness, clearly they would not be allowed as a deduction and the
income tax law is thereby consistent.
VI. DEDUCTIONS vs. COST OF GOODS SOLD
Black & White Printers can with certainty predict that if
they claim the excess payments over-ceiling as a deduction, the
Commissioner will disallow the deduction and prevail in court.
If we assume, however, that the blackmarket price was expended
for an item which was purchased for the purpose of resale, the
cost of the item would constitute the cost of the goods sold. This
then would not be a "deduction", but an offset against gross re-
ceipts.7 0 Would the illegality prevent Black & White from mak-
ing this offset? In order to examine the law in this regard it
is first necessary to explore the semantic and practical distinc-
tions between the terms "deductions" and "cost of goods sold".
Traditionally, the basic distinction between cost of goods sold
and deductions is based upon their respective business functions.
To the businessman, the cost of goods sold represents capital
assets or inventories which have been converted into money
through sale. The businessman and accountant carry inventories
or cost of goods purchased on the balance sheet as a part of
the current assets. This is considered a part of the working
capital. When the item is sold, the cost of the item sold is sub-
tracted from the sales price on the profit and loss statement to
determine their gross profit. All businessmen and accountants
operate upon the premise that there is no gain or profit until
at least the cost of the item sold, (cash outlay in the inventories)
is restored. Only then, do they consider that there has been a
gain or profit. The gross profit is not considered their ultimate
net gain derived from their business.
The items usually included in the cost of goods sold are:
(1) the purchase price of the goods bought and put into inven-
tories, (2) the freight and drayage charges on incoming mer-
chandise purchased, and (3) supplies consumed or added to the
goods. If the business is not a manufacturing concern, but just
a merchandising business, direct labor costs are not normally
70 Infra, note 105. 4 Merten's, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 25.47,
"The cost of an inventory item . . . is in the nature of a capital ex-
penditure which is recoverable through an offset against the sales
prices."
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
included. In a manufacturing concern, the direct and indirect
labor costs are included as well as a proportion of the overhead
expenses.
Accountants define cost of goods sold as:
The purchase price of goods bought, plus the cost of storage,
and transportation and delivery to the point where they are to
be used, and other costs pertaining to their acquisition and re-
ceipt.71
The Treasury Department's definition is consistent with that
of the accountants; in fact it is almost identical. Its definition
of costs of goods sold includes the purchase price, transportation
and other necessary charges incurred in acquiring possession of
the goods. Treasury Regulations also provide that the "cost of
goods sold should be determined in accordance with the method
of accounting consistently used by the taxpayer."
72
The Courts have cited accounting authority and have ap-
proved of the latter's definition of cost of goods sold. They sus-
tained the argument that the cost of goods sold includes the
invoice purchase price, plus freight in, hauling and unloading
charges and commissions for acquiring possession of the goods
purchased.7 3 The Courts have defined cost as meaning:
... the price or part of it paid by the buyer to the seller, as
consideration for the sale of goods; ... that which is actually
paid for goods; ... that which has to be given for a thing in order
to procure it, especially the price paid. [emphasis supplied] 74
71 Kohler, A Dictionary for Accountants, 2d ed., 1957, p. 145; MacFar-
land & Ayers, Accounting Fundamentals, 2d ed., 1947, p. 40; Lasser's
Standard Handbooks for Accountants, §§ 9.10 and 9.11 (1956).
72 Treasury Regulation, § 1.61-3, adopted T.D. 6272 (1957).
73 May, Stern & Co. v. Commissioner, 20 BTA 241 (1930); John L. Den-
ning & Co., Inc., 17 T.C. Memo 878, par. 48, 277, P-H Memo T.C. 48-878.
See Reiling, "Practical Aspects of Accounting", 30 Taxes 1028 (1952).
74 City Ice Delivery Co. v. United States, 176 F.2d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1949).
In Jones v. Herber, 198 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1952), the Court stated:
"Nowhere in the Internal Revenue Act or in the Treasury Regulations,
is there any intimation that the word 'cost' as used in the act and in
those regulations is to be denied its actual, economic and ordinary
meaning, and is to include only costs that are legally paid or as to
exclude costs actually paid in excess of those prescribed in the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of 1942." Id. at 545. See Hofferbert v. Com-
missioner, 197 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952). But contra, see dissenting
opinion in Guminski v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1952),
which stated: "The taxing authorities should not be compelled to
recognize a merchandise 'cost' the payment of which is expressly pro-
scribed and denounced as a crime by federal law, 'cost', as used in
the Treasury Regulation . . . means 'lawful cost'." Id. at 266.
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Deductions, according to business usage, do not represent
any capital asset. They represent the cost in money necessary
to operate a business other than in the acquisition of capital
assets and inventories. Deductions generally include salaries,
selling and shipping expenses, losses, and other items not directly
related to the purchase or production of merchandise. In income
tax meaning, deductions mean those items specifically provided
for in Section 162 as subtractions from gross income in determin-
ing taxable income. The accountants describe deductions as the
"cost of selling the goods, such as salaries and commissions paid
to salesmen, delivery expense, store supplies and advertising"' 7
(Emphasis supplied). To put it another way, deductions are the
expenses incurred in converting the inventories from current
assets into money or accounts receivables.
The Courts have consistently stated that there is a distinct
difference between cost of goods sold and deductions for purposes
of federal income tax. Cost of goods sold are not "deductions"
and are not subject to "legislative grace".7 6
Recently, however, this distinction was ignored by the Court
of Claims. In Pedone v. United States,77 the taxpayer was en-
gaged in the lathing and plastering business. He paid his em-
ployees more than the wages provided by the Wage Stabilization
Act.78 He treated the over-ceiling wage payment as a part of
his cost of goods sold, but the Commissioner disallowed this treat-
ment. The Court of Claims, in a refund suit, sustained the Com-
missioner. The Court said:
There is no doubt that in the ordinary case the wages of the
persons who work on the product sold are subtractable from the
sale price, in determining taxable income. Whether the subtrac-
tion is made in this column or that column, or this schedule or
that schedule, of the income tax form, does not, in the normal
case, affect the amount of the tax.79
The taxpayer argued that the cost of goods sold must be
75 See, MacFarland & Ayers, Accounting Fundamentals, 2d ed. 1947,
p. 40.
76 Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948); Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (2d
Cir. 1937); Hofferbert v. Anderson Oldsmobile, 197 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.
1952); 2 Merten's, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 16.17; vol. 4,
§ 25.47.
77 151.F.Supp. 288 (Ct.Cl., 1957).
78 Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 798, 803-812, as amended.
79 151 F.Supp. at 291.
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allowed as a matter of right, but the Court rejected this argu-
ment by saying:
If the 16th Amendment gives the Government leeway to
refuse to treat as a substractable cost of goods a perfectly lawful
wage or salary actually, because the Government rightfully con-
cludes that it is unreasonably large, it would seem that, a fortiori,
the Government could accord similar treatment to payments
made in violation of law or public policy.8 0
Observe that taxpayer was attempting to classify as cost of
goods sold, an item-wages, albeit excess wages-which we have
seen is normally classified as a deduction. Further, note that
the three items which are normally considered the elements of
cost of goods sold in a merchandising business [ (1) purchase price
of goods, (2) freight and drayage charges on the same and (3)
supplies consumed or added to the goods] would each have to
be enlarged considerably in prima facie meaning if they were
to encompass over-ceiling wage payments. In a manufacturing
business direct labor is admittedly a part of cost of goods sold.
But what constitutes cost of goods sold in a lathing and plastering
business? Such a business is neither a manufacturing enterprise
nor is it a merchandising business in the more average sense of
either term. Therefore, the Pedone Case presents an unusually
difficult case in this regard. In a personal service business does
any aspect of cost of goods sold exist?
The larger questions which come to the fore at this juncture,
however, are how the cost of goods sold concept may be more
specifically defined in a complex modern society wherein cost
accounting includes more indirect costs with purchase price, and
assuming an item is agreed by economists et al to be a part of
cost of goods sold can Congress constitutionally exclude it from
cost of goods sold and thereby, in effect, levy a tax on capital.
Or, to put the problem in slightly different terms-can Congress
constitutionally deny the subtraction of cost of goods sold from
gross receipts?
VII. IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
DENYING THE SUBTRACTION OF COST OF GOODS
SOLD FROM GROSS RECEIPTS?
In discussing the constitutional question involved, bear in
mind that Congress, under Article I of the United States Con-
so Id. at 292.
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stitution, has the power to tax gross receipts if it so desires.8 '
This right to tax gross receipts is limited to the exent that it
must be apportioned among the several states according to pop-
ulation, unless the Sixteenth Amendment gave Congress the power
to tax capital as well as income without apportionment. Whether
Congress ought to impose a tax on gross receipts and capital is
not within the scope of this article. The Question involved is
whether Congress can, under the Sixteenth Amendment, disallow
the subtraction of the cost of goods sold and consequently, im-
pose the tax upon the return of capital as well as upon gains
and profits?
In order to determine the answer to this question, it is neces-
sary to determine the meaning of the word "income" as used
in the Sixteenth Amendment,8 2 and compare it with the mean-
ing of "gross income" as used in the Code.8 3
It is generally agreed that the Sixteenth Amendment is not
the source of Congress' power to tax incomes. s 4 But, it is the
source of their power to tax incomes without apportionment
among the several states.8 5 The Sixteenth Amendment provides:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes from whatever source derived without apportionment
among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration.8 6
81 Under the original Constitution, Congress has the power to tax incomes,
but subject to the apportionment requirements of the Constitution,
Art. I, § 2(3) and Art. I, § 9(4).
82 For discussion of the use of the words in the Sixteenth Amendment,
see Sen. Rep. No. 2140, Part 2, 76th Cong. 3d Sess., p. 33.
83 For an argument that gross income is not income, see Redord, "Gross
Income is Not Income," 35 Taxes 851 (1957).
84 Source of Congress' power to tax incomes is U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
See Bowers v. Kerbaugh Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926). The amend-
ment neither conferred nor enlarged the taxing powers, Metcalf v.
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920); 1
Merten's, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 4.07.
85 The 16th Amendment did not extend the taxing power to new sub-jects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist
for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on incomes.
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Brushaber v. Union Pac.
R. R. Co., 240 U.S. 17; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916).
For discussion, see, Morrow, "The Income Tax Amendment," 10 Col.
L.Rev. 379 (1910).
86 U. S. Const., Amend. XVI.
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This Amendment does not define,8 7 nor does it affect, the
generic concept of income.88 Income as used in the 16th Amend-
ment must be determined by its meaning in the "common speech".89
For this purpose, the Supreme Court has defined income:
... as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained
through a sale or conversion of capital assets.90
The essence of income is that it is:
... essentially a gain or profit in itself of exchangeable value,
proceeding from capital, severed from it, and derived or received
by the taxpayer for his separate use, benefit and disposal.91
Although there is considerable theoretical difficulty in de-
termining the difference between income and capital, there is
substantial agreement that amounts received as a return of cap-
ital or investment are not income within the general meaning
of that term and may not be taxed under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment.92
87 Supra, note 77.
88 Supra, note 77. Peck & Co. Inc. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918); Metcalf
v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926). In Independent Life Ins. Co., 17 BTA
757, it is said that there is nothing in the history immediately pre-
ceding the 16th Amendment to give support to a more expansive use
of the word "income" that was considered in the 'Pollack case. In
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920), the Court said: "A
proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, re-
quires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose con-
struction so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those
provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment accord-
ing to population for direct taxes upon property, real or personal.
The limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and is
not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the Courts."
89 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); United States v. Safety Car
Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1935). But, it has been said that
the meaning of "income" is not controlled by the language of account-
ants and economics. Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 582
(8th Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Edison Bros. Shoes, Inc., 133 F.2d 575
(8th Cir. 1943).
90 Eisner v. Macomber, supra, note 86; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247
U.S. 179, 185 (1918); Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399
(1913); United States v. U. S. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co.,
297 U.S. 99 (1935).
91 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 207 (1920).
92 Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); See also Burnet v.
Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179
(1918); U. S. v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1936);
1 Merten's, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 5.06.
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In Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.,93 the Supreme Court was
presented the question of determining what was "income" for
purposes of the Excise Tax Act of 1909. The Solicitor General
argued that a conversion of capital into money always produced
income; that for purposes of the Act, the term "'gross income"
was the equivalent to "gross receipts"; and that the entire pro-
ceeds of the sale of timber should be treated as gross income.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that gross receipts
equalled gross income, stating:
In order to determine whether there has been gain or loss,
and the amount of the gain, if any, we must withdraw from the
gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value
that existed at the commencement of the period under consider-
ation.94
• ..when the act took effect, plaintiff's timber lands, with
whatever value they then possessed, were a part of its capital
assets, and subsequent change of form by conversion into money
did not change the essence.95
Although the Doyle Case was not bound by the Sixteenth
Amendment, it illustrates the proposition that the cost of prop-
erty is capital and as such, must be restored to the seller before
a sale can product a gain or profit, which is the subject of the
income tax law.
In Commissioner v. Pennroad Corporation,9 6 the issue was
whether a settlement was taxable as income even though it did
not completely compensate the injured party for its loss. The
Court held that the settlement could not be included in gross
income until the capital loss incurred had been restored. The
Court stated:
The capital which Pennroad lost was not restored by the set-
tlement. . . . In order to determine whether there has been
gain or loss, and the amount of the gain, if any, we must with-
draw from the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore
the capital value that existed at the commencement of the period
under consideration.9 7
The Circuit Court expressed its opinion that the income tax
93 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
94 Id. at p. 185. See also, Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 83; Hays
v. Gauley Mountain Coal Corp., 247 U.S. 189 (1918).
95 247 U.S. at 186.
96 228 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1955).
97 Id. at p. 331.
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laws ought to be applied realistically and reality forbids the im-
position of a tax on losses.0 8
Congress, unfortunately, did not use the language of the
Sixteenth Amendment when it enacted the subsequent income
tax laws. Instead, they used the terms "gross income" and "tax-
able income". 99 But it is quite clear that:
Congress cannot by any definition [of income] it may adopt
conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Con-
stitution, from which it alone derives its powers to legislate and
within those limitations alone that power be lawfully exercised.100
Gross income is defined as "all income from whatever source
derived".1 0 Taxable income is defined as "gross income, minus
the deductions allowed by this chaper .... ,,102 One thing is
certain, gross income cannot constitutionally include capital. Un-
der the Code, gross income is the starting point in determining
what is taxable income. In Winkler v. United States, 0 3 the
Circuit Court held that the losses paid out by a bookmaker should
be excluded from gross income. They reasoned that:
The justification for excluding returns of capital from gross
incomes goes deeper than mere treasury regulations and rests
ultimately upon constitutional concepts. There is a general
agreement that amounts received as a return of capital or invest-
ment are not income within the general meaning of that term
and may not be taxed under the Sixteenth Amendment.' 0 4
98 Id. at p. 332, where the Court stated: "to hold to the contrary in
the instant case is to treat loss as gain. Reality forbids the imposi-
tion of tax in the instant case."
99 Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 61; Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 63.
100 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920). See Anderson Olds-
mobile v. Hofferbert, 102 F.Supp. 902 (D.C. Md. 1952), where the
Court stated: "The taxpayer cannot deny his receipts of income on
the ground that it resulted from illegal transaction, but neither can
Congress find the existence of income where there is none by reason
of illegality." Cf. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
101 Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 61.
102 Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 63.
103 230 F.2d 766 (1st Cir. 1956).
104 Id. at p. 770. The Court in its opinion compared the bookmaker
to a business wherein they stated: "in a certain sense a bookmaker
may be likened to a merchant, one major difference being that in-
stead of selling articles at a price exceeding the cost, the bookmaker,
in effect, utilizes the laws of probability in such a way to enable
him to sell a certain undeterminate amount of money." See 1 Mer-
ten's, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 5.06.
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The term gross income is not synonymous with the term
gross receipts. 105 Gross receipts is a broader term in meaning
and included within it are receipts which may constitute capital
as well as income. Since capital may not be constitutionally
taxed as income, 0 6 it can only follow that gross income is some-
thing less than gross receipts. If the taxpayer deals in some-
thing -other than merchandise or products, it is quite possible
that gross income may be the equivalent of gross receipts. In
that case, there would be no constitutional prohibition against
taxing the gross receipts, but there would be no cost of goods
sold involved either.
The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that gross
income is gross receipts when goods are sold by the taxpayer.
In its own language, the Supreme Court stated:
We must reject .. the broad contention submitted in be-
half of the government that all receipts-everything that comes
in-are income within the proper definition of the term 'gross
income'. 0 7
It is well accepted that Congress in general intended gross
income to be co-extensive with the word income as used in the
Sixteenth Amendment. 08 The primary limiting point deals with
capital; since it may not be taxed under the Amendment, it
certainly cannot be taxed by a definition of Congress. There-
fore, when the cost of the merchandise or product sold is involved,
Congress cannot constitutionally tax gross receipts because that
would, in part, be a tax upon the return of capital. 109
'Or Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918); Hays v. Gauley,
supra note 91; Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, supra note 84. See 1
Merten's, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 5.10.
100 It should be pointed out once again that Congress can tax capital
and gross receipts under the Constitution if they apportion the tax
among the several states according to population. See, supra, note 73.
But not under the 16th Amendment.
107 Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918). In Doyle v.
Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918), the Court stated that "Gross
- income is not equivalent to gross receipts." See 1 Merten's, Law of
Federal Income Taxation, § 5.10.
108 See Rutkin v. U. S., 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
109 In Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948), the Tax Court flatly stated "no
more than gross income can be subjected to income tax upon any
theory." The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated: "Constitution-
ally, the only thing that can be taxed by Congress is 'income'. The
tax is not, never has been, and could not constitutionally be upon
gross receipts." Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., supra note 85; Southern
Pac. Co. v. Lowe, supra note 85; See Anderson Oldsmobile v. Hoffer-
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Since capital may not be taxed under the 16th Amendment
and since cost of goods sold represents a return of capital, the
legality or illegality of the expenditure would be immaterial
in regard to its subtracting from gross receipts if it constituted
part of the cost of goods sold." 0 Congress cannot deny this ex-
clusion from gross receipts by use of the rules "frustration of
public policy" or "as matters of legislative grace", because what
the Constitution exempts, Congress cannot include."'
Another argument used by the Courts in allowing the exclu-
sion of cost of goods sold from gross receipts is that:
... as an economic and mathematical truism, gain or profit
which constituted gross income cannot be determined without
deducting the cost of the goods sold from the gross selling price.112
Now, at this juncture let us return to Black & White Printers
and the possible tax treatment afforded them (a) when they
utilize over-ceiling payments as part of cost of goods sold, and
(b) when they purchase stock in a supplier during an "OPA
period" in order to procure paper, subsequently selling this in-
terest at a loss. Is such a loss to be allowed as a "cost of goods
sold" item-thereby enabling taxpayers to utilize the expenditure
(vis a vis the "loss") as a one year offset against gross income,
or is this a capital expenditure so that the money spent (i.e. the
"loss") can only be used as a capital loss and offset against cap-
ital gains?
VIII. EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY ON THE COST
OF GOODS SOLD
If the illegal expenditure constitutes part of the cost of goods
sold, there is a line of cases decided under the Emergency Price
bert, 102 F.Supp. 902 (D.C. Md. 1952). 4 Merten's, Law of Federal
Income Taxation, § 25.47, states: "the cost of goods sold is in the
nature of a capital expenditure which is recoverable through an offset
against the sales price."
110 See infra, § VIII, Effect of Illegality on the Cost of Goods Sold,
page 22.
111 See supra, text at page 19 and footnote 92. See also Davis v. U. S.,
87 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1937), where the Court distinguished between
certain deductions to which the taxpayer was entitled as a matter
of fundamental law and those which rested on legislative grace. It
included in the former such items as the cost of goods sold, ordinary
and necessary expenses incurred in the receipt of gross income,
depletion and depreciation.
112 Anderson Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Hofferbert, 102 F.Supp. 902, 905 (D.C.
Md. 1952).
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Control Act of 1942, which hold that such payments are prop-
erly allowed in determining gross income.1 13 The rules of ordi-
nary and necessary expense, and frustration of public policy, do
not affect the cost of goods sold since the former apply only to
the statutory deductions under section 162.
The leading case is Sullenger,14 where the taxpayer paid
over-ceiling prices for meat which he bought for resale. He
offset the cost of the meat from the gross receipts in determin-
ing gross income. The Commissioner argued that the payments
were not really cost of goods sold, but were "bribes". He con-
tended they were deductions and as such, are allowed as a matter
of legislative grace and not of right and to allow these would
be contrary to public policy. The Court rejected the Commis-
sioner's arguments and allowed them as costs of goods sold. The
Tax Court reasoned:
The trouble with his [Commissioner's] argument is that its
major premise is unsound. The amounts in question were actually,
as the stipulations show, a part of the cost of goods sold and are
not being claimed by this petitioner as a deduction under section
23. Section 23 makes no provision for the cost of goods sold,
but the Commissioner has always recognized, as indeed he must
to stay within the Constitution, that the cost of goods sold must
be deducted from gross receipts in order to arrive at gross income.
No more than gross income can be subjected to income tax upon
any theory. The income from a business which is wholly illegal
was held subject to income tax in United States v. Sullivan, 274
U. S. 259. Nevertheless, it was necessary to determine what that
income was, and the cost of an illegal purchase of liquor was
subtracted from proceeds of the illegal transaction which were
subject to income tax in that case. This is not a case of penalties
provided for violation of the 0. P. A. regulations . . . No author-
ity has been cited for denying to this taxpayer the cost of goods
sold in computing his profit, which profit alone is his gross in-
come for income tax purposes. It is unnecessary to discuss cases
involving deductions, since this case does not involve any de-
duction.115
113 A few of these cases are: Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1943); Guminski,
10 TCM 173 (1951) aff'd 198 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1952); Herber v.
Jones, 103 F.Supp. 210 (D.C. Okla. 1951); Anderson Oldsmobile Inc. v.
Hofferbert, 102 F.Supp. 902 (D.C. Md. 1952); Commissioner v. Weis-
man, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952). See, Krekstein, "Deductibility of
Over-Ceiling Payments." 6 NYU Tax Inst. 703 (1947), for discus-
sion of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.
114 11 T.C. 1076 (1948).
115 Id. at p. 1079.
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In Anderson Oldsmobile Inc. v. Hofferbert,11 the taxpayer
was in the business of buying and selling used cars. He paid
more than the ceiling price for the cars and claimed them as
part of his cost of goods sold. The Commissioner denied the
excess amount over ceiling. The Court held that the cost of
goods sold, even though it included expenditures which violated
the OPA and consequently illegal, must be allowed. The Court
reasoned:
• . . as an economic and mathematic truism, gain or profits
which constitutes gross income cannot be determined without
deducting the cost of the goods sold from the gross selling price.
The deductions so made in the computation is a necessary one
under section 22 to determine gross income and is definitely dif-
ferent and distinct from the deduction authorized by section 23
to be made from gross income to determine net income.117
The Court gave the following reason for rejecting the frustra-
tion of public policy rule:
It may properly shock the conscience of the court to find an
otherwise respectable businessman in flagrant violation of valid
laws enacted for public good in war time, but this does not justify
applying the somewhat uncertain contours of public policy in the
purely mathematical computation of what constitutes income.
The taxpayer cannot deny his receipts of income on the ground
that it resulted from illegal transactions; but neither can the
Commissioner find the existence of income where there is none
by reason of illegality. 118
Herber v. Jones,1 9 involved payments in excess of ceiling
prices for used cars. The Court allowed the purchase price as
an offset against gross receipts as cost of goods sold. In so hold-
ing, they stated:
Congress by the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, was
empowered to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived .... Gross income, for the purposes of this ac-
tion, includes gains and profits derived from the sales of auto-
mobiles in question. Money actually paid, although in excess
of the prevailing ceiling price, for the purchase price of an article
cannot be classified as a gain, profit or income.120
If the violations of ceiling prices were incurred for the purpose
of acquiring goods for resale, the illegality will not affect its
116 102 F.Supp. 902 (D.C. Md. 1952).
117 Id. at page 905.
11s Id. at page 908.
I'D 103 F.Supp. 210 (D.C. Okla. 1951).
120 Id. at 214; Conclusion of Law IV of the Court.
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allowance as a part of cost of goods sold. The Commissioner fin-
ally acquiesced and so stated in a 1952 ruling.1 21
The effect of OPA violations under the 1942 Act is now
settled but does this same rule prevail in other areas of illegality?
In James P. McKenna,1 22 the Commissioner sought to tax a
race-track bookmaker on his total receipts. The Board held that
the gross income which was taxable from bookmaking operations
was the actual gain. They held that the taxpayer must be al-
lowed to apply his losses against his total receipts since he op-
erated on a modified parimutual basis. The amounts allowed
were pay-offs to bettors, scratches, and called-off bets. The Board
stated that the statutory deductions were not involved, but only
the computation of gross income. They concluded:
... that the actual gain or profit derived from the taxpayers
operations in laying wagers on horses racing under his system of
handbooks-known as bookmaking-is the aggregate of his re-
ceipts less the amounts paid out to bettors . . . The formulajust given will represent the actual gains to the taxpayer and as
such constitute "gross income" within the meaning of section
213(a) of the Revenue Act of 1918.123
In another Board of Tax Appeals case,1 24 which involved
illegal importing and selling distilled spirits, the Commissioner
asserted a deficiency upon the amount of gross receipts from
sales. The Board distinguished between the expenses incurred
in the purchase and acquisition of the liquor and those neces-
itated by the illegality of the transaction. It denied the latter
type of deductions, but recognized that the cost of goods sold
should be allowed in determining gross income. In regard to
gross income, the Board stated:
... while we are required to compute gross income in the
same manner whether the taxpayers business be legal or illegal,
we do not allow the same deductions in computing taxable in-
come.125
121 I.T. 4104, 1952-2 Cum. Bull. 71. The burden is now on the taxpayer
to prove the actual payments in excess of OPA ceiling prices. Naffco
v. Fahs, 126 F.Supp. 794 (D.C. Fla. 1954); Roybark v. United States,
218 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1955). Cf. Harris v. United States, 125 F.Supp.
175 (D.C. Ga. 1953). Had the Government confiscated the illegal pur-
chased goods, the taxpayer is denied its cost as an expense or as
part of the cost of goods sold because the goods are no longer avail-
able for resale. Fuller v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 308 (1953).
122 1 B.T.A. 326 (1925).
123 Id. at p. 333.
124 Kjar, ff 41,446 P-H B.T.A. Memo p. 972 (1941).
125 Id. at page 978.
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Black & White Printers may, therefore, successfully claim
the illegal payments in excess of ceiling price, if such payments
constitute a part of the cost of goods sold. Seemingly, illegality
of the payments has no effect upon their allowability as a part
of cost of goods sold.126  But, this is not a truly settled issue
since the majority of cases on this point involved the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942.127 Under the Defense Production Act
of 1950,12s Congress has expressly authorized the President to
impose tax restrictions for enforcement purpose. Quere as to the
constitutionality of such restriction?
Now, let us assume that Black & White Printers do not want
to make direct over-ceiling payments and utilize such over-ceiling
amounts as a deduction (which would be promptly disallowed),
and there is some doubt in regard to utilizing such over-ceiling
payments as an offset against gross receipts utilizing the cost of
goods sold. Black & White Printers decide, therefore, to pur-
chase the controlling stock in their major paper suppliers. In
so doing, they pay, in effect, a premium for the stock. This
premium later becomes a "loss" when the emergency ends and
the stock is sold. What is the tax treatment of this "loss" or
''premium payment".
IX. EFFECT OF LEGAL STOCK PURCHASES
TO ACQUIRE GOODS
If Black & White Printers had purchased stock in a paper
manufacturing company for the sole purpose of acquiring the
scarce paper and later sold the stock at a loss, the loss would
normally be treated either as a business expense or as part of
the cost of the goods purchased. Such a stock purchase is con-
sidered an incident of carrying on their business, not an invest-
ment, because it is a step in the process of acquiring merchan-
dise.129
126 But see the dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Guminski, 198
F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1952), wherein it is stated: "I am opposed to an
exterpretation of the tax laws which will enable a taxpayer to gain
a tax advantage by violating the price stabilization laws, thus plac-
ing himself in a better position than had he obeyed the law."
127 50 U.S.C.A. App. 3; 56 Stat. 23.
128 50 U.S.C.A. App. 308; 64 Stat. 798. This act was suspended February
6, 1953, by E.O. 10434, 18 Fed. Reg. 809.
129 For an interesting discussion of this characterization of stock losses,
see, Bierman, "The Chameleon Concept: Security Losses As Ordi-
nary Business Expenses," 12 N.Y.U. Tax Inst. p. 1119 (1954).
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In Western Wine & Liquor Co. v. Commissioner,130 a Ne-
braska liquor wholesaler purchased 2550 shares of stock in a
supplier (the American Distilling Co.) in order to keep its own
distributing business going during the war. This stock carried
with it a right to purchase liquor at inventory cost. After the
taxpayer had exercised his whiskey rights, they sold the stock
at a loss of $154,149. The difference between the purchase price
and sale price was treated as part of the cost of the whiskey.
The Commissioner contended it was a short-term capital loss.
The Tax Court, in holding that this was properly treated as cost
of the whiskey purchased, stated:
We think this taxpayer acquired the Distilling Stock as an
incident to the conduct of its business and not for investment,
and that it held the stock only long enough to acquire the whiskey
and then sold it to reduce the cost of the whiskey as much as
possible. In the circumstances, and as contended by taxpayer,
the sale of the securities became an incident of the business. The
loss was not a capital loss of taxpayer. 1' 1
The same result was reached by the Tax Court even though
the taxpayer purchased stock to circumvent the OPA ceiling-
prices. In Hoffman Lumber Co.,' 3 " the taxpayer agreed to pur-
chase stock in addition to the OPA ceiling price for lumber. The
stock was purchased at $100 per share, but the taxpayer had
to give the lumber company an option to purchase the stock
back at $1.00 per share. The taxpayer was required to buy one
share per 10,000 ft. of lumber purchased. The option was ex-
ercised and the taxpayer treated the $99 per share loss as a
part of the cost of goods sold. The Tax Court in sustaining the
taxpayer stated:
The stock purchase transaction was an obvious sham to cir-
cumvent the OPA price regulations. As to both transactions,
that is the lumber and shingles, the evidence permits of no other
conclusion than that the petitioner paid the disputed amounts as
over-ceiling prices on the purchase of the materials. As such they
constituted a part of the cost of goods sold.' 33
It appears, superficially, that Black & White Printers will
receive the same tax treatment whether they legally purchase
130 18 T.C. 1090 (1952), appeal dismissed (8th Cir 6-17-53). See also, Clark,
19 T.C. 48, appeal dismissed (6th Cir. 6-18-53); Hogg v. Allen, 105 F.
Supp. 12 (D.C. Ga.) aff'd 214 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1954).
131 18 T.C. at 1099. Also see Palm Beach Liquors, Inc., T.C. pT617 CCH.
132 Para. 52,174 P-H Memo T.C. (1952). See also, Y. M. Young Co., para.
52,250 P-H Memo T.C. (1952).
133 Id. at page 52-509.
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stock to obtain the paper or illegally pay over-ceiling prices and
in both cases utilize the premiums paid as a part of cost of goods
sold. But, this is not necessarily true!
In Sackstein v. Commissioner,134 the taxpayer had difficulty
getting enough meat at OPA prices to carry on his business. United
Meat Company agreed to supply him with meat if the taxpayer
would purchase their stock and, in addition, pay further amounts
to meet the anticipated losses of United in proportion to the
amount of meat purchased. The stock and additional payments
of the taxpayer totaled $7,219 and he treated these expenditures
as part of the cost of the meat. The Commissioner argued and
the Tax Court held, that the payments were not part of the cost
of the goods sold nor even ordinary and necessary expenses (a
possible deduction), but a capital expenditure. The taxpayer
argued that this was a device to circumvent the OPA price reg-
ulations, and was really the cost of the meat. The Tax Court,
in rejecting the taxpayer's argument, stated:
These payments were in addition to the top price permitted
by the OPA laws. If they are to be added as a part of the cost of
the meat, then the total cost was in excess of a lawful price and
it would be difficult to distinguish the transaction from a "black
market" purchase. If that were true, then United really repre-
sented a scheme devised to avoid the letter of the law at the same
time violating its spirit. Improper motives and illegal acts should
not be lightly imputed, especially where another more logical in-
terpretation of, the testimony can be made..35
In essence, the Tax Court ignored what really transpired.
It was clear that this Was nothing other than an indirect payment
for the purchase of meat in violation of the ceiling-prices.
Since the Tax Court has put a very high burden upon the
taxpayer to persuade it that a stock purchase is made as an inci-
dent of carrying on his business, rather than as an investment,
a taxpayer cannot predict with any degree of accuracy the pos-
sible tax consequences of such a transaction.
Therefore, from a tax standpoint, the Black & White Printers
can, with reasonable certainty, predict that "black market" pay-
134 14 T.C. 566 (1950). This case may not be controlling because the
Hoffman Lumber Co., supra note 79, was decided 2 years later on
same issue. But, this case still stands for the Tax Court's reluctance
to call a stock loss a part of the cost of the goods purchased when
it is a device to circumvent the law. See, Jaeger, f1 50,306 P-H
Memo T.C. (1950), failed to prove payments for stock should be in-
cluded as part of the cost of meat purchased.
'13 Id., at page 568.
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ments, when treated directly as cost of goods sold, will be al-
lowed. If they were to purchase stock in a supplier in order to
obtain the same paper which they could buy on the "black market",
they cannot, with any reasonable certainty, predict the tax treat-
ment of a possible loss on the sale of such stock. In this situation,
illegality receives complete tax relief while legality is not ac-
corded the same clear relief under the present income tax laws.
X. CONCLUSION
Under the Internal Revenue Code, there are no provisions
establishing the effect which illegality shall have upon deducti-
bility. As a result, the Treasury Department and the Courts have
created the doctrine of "frustration of public policy", and the
concepts of "illegality" and "legitimate expenses of an illegitimate
business", in deciding the allowability of deductions in this area.
These concepts have resulted in unequal tax treatment. The
deductibility of an expenditure does not depend upon the nature
of the illegal act, but upon the type of business involved. If the
taxpayer is engaged in a business which has a commodity for
sale, or in the case of bookmakers and gamblers, calculated losses,
the test of "illegality" is not applied to the cost of the commodity.
Only those expenditures not directly attributable to the cost of
a commodity are the ones subject to the illegality test. Thus,
there is inequality among those involved in illegal activities.
No one will contend that a taxpayer ought to benefit tax wise
from his illegal conduct, nor feel sorry for him when his "im-
moral" deductions are disallowed. But, the tests have gone fur-
ther. It is quite possible for a taxpayer engaged in a legal busi-
ness, following a legal course of action, to be denied his expenses
which would have been allowed had he been engaged in illegal
activities rather than legal activities or if he had chosen to di-
rectly violate some law connected with his legal business. It is
at this point that the income tax laws need readjustment. Such
a result encourages rather than discourages noncompliance with
the law. It also "frustrates" the Treasury Department's policy
of disallowing deductions which "frustrate public policy". It is
true that a person ought not be allowed to benefit from immoral
conduct, but is income tax litigation the proper arena for such
moral determination?
